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A Kiss Is Just a Kiss, or Is It? A Comparative Look at
Italian and American Sex Crimes
∗

∗∗

Alberto Cadoppi & Michael Vitiello
I.

INTRODUCTION

Over the course of recent decades, both American and Italian
law have made efforts to deal with numerous challenging cases involving rape and other sexual offenses. In particular, two Italian cases
emphasize the important issues at play. In the first, a man kissed a
young female and was convicted of a violation of Italy’s sexual offense
1
statute (roughly akin to rape). In the second, the offender’s conduct
2
consisted of slapping the victim’s bottom. Two aspects of those cases
are surprising. First, the cases demonstrate significant advances in
Italian society in these matters. This is, after all, the country where a
judge made international headlines just over a decade ago when he
announced a rule that a man could not possibly rape a woman wear3
ing tight blue jeans. Second, the defendants in both cases were
4
charged with sexual violence, the Italian offense most similar to rape.
By contrast, even though American law has responded to many
feminist concerns about sexual autonomy, one might readily question
whether such conduct would be prosecuted as sex offenses under
5
American law.
Though these cases might fall under certain state
∗

Professor in Criminal Law, University of Parma, J.D. Rome, 1988. Professor
Cadoppi is also a member of the board of the review l’Indice Penale. Professor Cadoppi wishes to extend a special thanks to Malaika Bianchi for her assistance with
this Article.
∗∗
Distinguished Professor and Scholar, Pacific McGeorge School of Law; J.D.,
University of Pennsylvania; B.A., Swarthmore College. Professor Vitiello thanks his
excellent research assistants Oona Mallett and Mariel Covarrubias for their assistance
with this article and Ms. Covarrubias for her help with the translation of the various
Italian cases from Italian to English.
1
Cass. pen., sez. III, 26 jan. 2006, n.19808, Guida al Diritto, n. 37, 2006, 88.
2
Cass. pen., sez. III., 23 sept. 2004, n.37395, Riv. Pen. 2004, 1189.
3
See Alessandra Stanley, Ruling on Tight Jeans and Rape Sets Off Anger in Italy, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 16, 1999, at A6.
4
See CODICE PENALE [C.P.] art. 609-bis (Italy).
5
In Bailey v. State, 764 N.E.2d 728, 731–32 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002), the Court of
Appeals of Indiana held that grabbing was sexual battery, demonstrating that Vitiel-
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laws covering lower classes of sex offenses, neither case would likely
amount to rape. Two American cases further demonstrate how much
Italian law differs from American law in this area. In the first case, a
seventeen-year-old boy was videotaped engaging in consensual oral
6
sex with a fifteen-year-old girl at a holiday party. The second case involves basketball superstar Kobe Bryant and allegations that he raped
7
a hotel employee. Although the Bryant case never went to trial, vari8
ous versions of the facts were widely reported. As the facts emerged,
they mirrored those of the kind of case—now more publicly discussed—in which a woman has not consented to intercourse but the
man believes that she has.
This Article, a joint effort between scholars in both Italian and
American criminal law, contrasts these cases. Part II develops the
Italian cases, including their disposition in Italy. In Part III, Vitiello
discusses how American courts would resolve these cases. In Part IV,
Vitiello discusses normative concerns and, especially in light of America’s heightened punishments for sexual offenders, questions whether American jurisdictions should treat these as sexual offenses. Part V
develops the two American cases. In Part VI, Cadoppi explores how
Italian law would resolve the two American cases. Finally, in Part VII,
Cadoppi asks the normative question: do the Americans or the Italians have the better view?
II. IS A KISS JUST A KISS?
A. Italian Criminal Case Number 19808

9

In 1994 in Sanremo, Italy, an assistant chief of the state police
10
commanded his colleague to meet him at an isolated beach at night.
The accused, “G.G.,” shut off the engine of his service vehicle and at11
tempted to kiss his colleague, “R.C.” She resisted and placed her
12
hand over his mouth in order to stop him. He then commanded

lo’s intuitive response was wrong. Contra Scott-Gordon v. State, 579 N.E.2d 602, 604
(Ind. 1991) (grab of the buttocks was not alone sufficient to meet the force element
of the statute).
6
Wilson v. State, 631 S.E.2d 391, 392 (Ga. Ct. App. 2006).
7
See infra notes 268–271 and accompanying text.
8
See infra notes 272–276 and accompanying text.
9
Cass. pen., sez. III, 26 jan. 2006, n.19808, Guida al Diritto, n. 37, 2006, 88.
10
Id. at 88.
11
Id. at 89.
12
Id.
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her to drive to a place with a panoramic view, where he grabbed her
13
14
and kissed her neck. Again, she objected.
G.G. was charged with violating article 609-bis of the Italian Pen15
al Code. Prior to 1996, rape was a crime against public morality, not
16
a crime against the person. Like changes in rape law elsewhere, article 609-bis was a victory for feminists and raised public awareness
17
about violence towards women.
The law is now unequivocally a
crime against the person. Unlike traditional rape laws, article 609-bis
18
does not require penetration. Instead, the offense is committed
whenever a person “with violence or threat or by means of abuse of
19
authority, forces someone to perform or undergo sexual acts.”
Convicted in 2000 and sentenced to sixteen months in prison, G.G.
20
appealed his conviction. He contended, in part, that the evidence
was insufficient because his acts were mere “advances” and that R.C.’s
21
autonomy was not impaired.
On appeal, the court focused on how to interpret the “sexual
acts” language of the article. The interpretation was broad and in22
cluded any conduct involving carnal touching. More specifically, a
sexual act can include anything that results in bodily contact between
an actor and his passive subject, even if fleeting and not otherwise
23
endangering the subject’s sexual self-determination. Thus, article
609-bis encompasses not just acts involving the genitals, but includes
those involving any erogenous areas. A court may determine what an
erogenous zone is by reference to medical, psychological, and socio24
logical-anthropological sciences. Although such an interpretation
means that a person from a culture whose members routinely kiss
upon meeting may not be guilty of the offense, the facts before the
court clearly indicated that G.G. was performing a sexually aggressive
act.
13

Id.
Id.
15
Cass. pen., sez. III, 26 jan. 2006, n.19808, Guida al Diritto, n. 37, 2006, 88.
16
C.P. art. 519.
17
For an analysis of the Italian law, see generally Alberto Cadoppi, Commento art.
609-bis C.P., in COMMENTARIO DELLE NORME CONTRO LA VIOLENZA SESSUALE E CONTRO LA
PEDOFILIA 439 (Alberto Cadoppi ed., 4th ed. 2006).
18
C.P. art. 609-bis.
19
Id.
20
Cass. pen., sez. III, 26 jan. 2006, n.19808, Guida al Diritto, n. 37, 2006, 88.
21
Id.
22
Id. at 89.
23
Id.
24
Id.
14
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Further, the court found the necessary “violence” required in ar25
ticle 609-bis. According to some criminal literature, surprise alone
would not be enough to satisfy the elements of the offense; however,
26
the Supreme Court disagreed. The court held that the necessary violence element may be satisfied in situations where the actor puts the
27
victim in a position where she cannot resist. Furthermore, the court
found that the element is also met when the rapid completion of the
28
criminal action combines with an act that overcomes her will. Thus,
the court concluded that G.G. did more than kiss R.C. suddenly, an
act that would have merely surprised her. Surprise, alone, would not
divide a simple kiss from a prohibited act of sexual violence. G.G. did
more than merely kiss; after she placed her hand over his mouth, he
29
continued to force himself upon her.
B. Italian Criminal Case Number 37395

30

The second noteworthy case involved the sexually inappropriate
31
conduct of “A.M.,” a magistrate of the Court of Cassation in Rome.
A.M. was charged with various violations of article 609-bis involving
32
different women. But the gravamen of his offenses was the “lustful
33
touching of the buttocks.” While that was his sexual act, he engaged
34
in other behavior that made the sexuality of the touching explicit.
A.M. was convicted of various offenses, resulting in a maximum term
35
of imprisonment.
Among his arguments on appeal, A.M. contended that the term
“sexual act” in article 609-bis could not include his conduct and that
the statutory element instead required “carnal conjunction” and “vio36
Further, he contended that the definition of the
lent acts of lust.”
statutory element, “sexual act,” is not agreed upon in common usage
25

Cass. pen., sez. III, 26 jan. 2006, n.19808, Guida al Diritto, n. 37, 2006, 89.
Id.; see also Giuliano Balbi, Violenza sessuale, in VII ENCICLOPEDIA GIURIDICA 9,
(1999); Stefania Tabarelli De Fatis, Sulla rilevanza penale del bacio come atto di libidine
prima e dopo la riforma dei reati sessuali, 1997 RIVISTA ITALIANA DI DIRITTO E PROCEDURA
PENALE 975.
27
Id.
28
Id.
29
Id.
30
Cass. pen., sez. III, 23 sept. 2004, n.37395, Riv. Pen. 2004, 1189.
31
Id. at 1189.
32
Id. at 1191.
33
Id. at 1189.
34
Id. at 1195.
35
Id. at 1189.
36
Cass. pen., sez. III, 23 sept. 2004, n.37395, Riv. Pen. 2004, 1189, 1190.
26
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or in scientific literature and that his conviction therefore violated
37
constitutional principles of definiteness.
Rejecting the first argument, the court looked at the change in
the law, which featured an intentional emphasis on the sexual auton38
omy of the victim. Thus, sexual acts may involve constraining a pas39
sive victim through violence, threat, or abuse of authority. But more
relevant to the case before the court, a sexual act may be any act that
results in physical contact between the actor and the passive subject
that involves the subject’s sexuality and is likely to endanger the sub40
ject’s self-determination.
Next, the court broadly defined “sexual.” Not limited to an act
involving the genitals of the actor and victim, “sexual” includes
41
touching those areas that medical science deems erogenous. This
interpretation is consistent, in the court’s view, with the underlying
42
shift in policy in the 1996 statute. Therefore, the court reached its
conclusion despite the fact that acts involving the parties’ genitals are
almost always sexual while other acts, such as a slap on the buttocks,
may not always be sexual in nature. Instead, the court determined
that the sexual nature of an act must be assessed in its overall context.
Viewed in that light, the court found A.M.’s conduct to be “sexual” in
nature.
Similar to the American constitutional doctrine of “vagueness,”
Article 25 of the Italian Constitution requires that a law be drawn sufficiently precisely to allow citizens to be able to determine the line be43
tween legal and illegal conduct. Thus, A.M. argued that lumping
rape and sexual violence in one generic term, “sexual acts,” lacked
44
sufficient definiteness. That breadth leaves the interpretation of
prohibited conduct to the judge’s discretion.
45
The court rejected A.M.’s arguments. The court considered
the legislature’s decision to make article 609-bis a crime against personal freedom rather than a crime against public morality, then concluded that the legislature’s intent was to protect against acts impair-

37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45

Id.
Id. at 1190.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1192.
Cass. pen., sez. III, 23 sept. 2004, n.37395, Riv. Pen. 2004, 1189, 1192.
Id. at 1191.
Id.
Id. at 1191–92.
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ing a person’s self-determination. This legislative decision provided
courts guidance on how to interpret the phrase “sexual act”; that is,
the court should make punishable acts that violate the freedom of
sexual self-determination. Requiring greater specificity would run
the risk of allowing offenders to avoid prosecution for conduct erosive of self-determination. Further, the Constitutional Court has often upheld legislation where the legislature has used phrases with
47
commonly understood meanings.
Language may be sufficiently
precise by reference to non-legal concepts. As a result, the term
“sexual act” becomes sufficiently precise to withstand constitutional
48
scrutiny.
III. HOW WOULD AN AMERICAN COURT TREAT THE CONDUCT OF
G.G. AND A.M.?
To answer the question posed above, some consideration must
be given to variations in state law. This Article will consider New Jersey, Alabama, Indiana, and California, so as to canvass one jurisdiction each from the east coast, south, midwest and west coast. As developed in this Part, while G.G.’s conduct could be sexual battery, no
reported case involving similar conduct in those jurisdictions could
49
be located, other than one case in Indiana where an offender was
50
convicted of sexual battery for slapping a woman’s buttocks. Nonetheless, such cases appear to be extremely rare. A cursory glance at
51
case law in other states suggests a dearth of prosecutions for similar
conduct, with one notable exception. That exception involves adult
52
offenders who have sexual contact with minors.

46

Id. at 1192.
See id. at 1192.
48
See id.
49
See infra note 129 and accompanying text.
50
See Bailey v. State, 764 N.E.2d 728, 730 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002).
51
I examined leading treatises and Criminal Law case books on the assumption
that those texts would include the unusual case. That review did not reveal any cases
similar to G.G. See, e.g., JOSHUA DRESSLER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CRIMINAL LAW
(4th ed. 2007); J DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW (5th ed. 2009) [hereinafter DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW]; WAYNE R. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW (4th
ed. 2003); SANFORD H. KADISH, STEPHEN J. SCHULHOFER & CAROL S. STEIKER, CRIMINAL
LAW AND ITS PROCESSES: CASES AND MATERIALS, (8th ed. 2007);JOHN KAPLAN, ROBERT
WEISBERG & GUYORA BINDER, CRIMINAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS (6th ed. 2008).
52
See, e.g., State v. Rodriguez, 174 P.3d 1100 (Or. Ct. App. 2007), rev’d in part, 217
P.3d 659 (Or. 2009).
47
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Unlike Italian law, American jurisdictions typically divide sex
53
crimes into distinct offenses. Article 609-bis, by contrast, conflates
54
any sexual assault with rape. Modern American jurisdictions single
out rape as the most serious sexual offense, but now have a variety of
55
sexual offenses.
A. The Development of American Sexual Assault Law
A brief detour may help clarify the contours of American rape
law. Prior to the mid-twentieth century, most jurisdictions grouped a
56
variety of “rape” crimes together. That is, rape occurred when the
male forced intercourse, when the female was under a specified age,
when the victim was mentally incapable of giving consent, when the
female was unconscious, or when the male misled the female into be57
lieving that he was her husband. Judges might be given wide latitude on the appropriate sentence; for example, California allowed
the judge to sentence the offender to a term of anywhere from three
58
years to life in prison.
By the mid-twentieth century, some jurisdictions abandoned the
59
single-category approach to rape. A jurisdiction might, for example,
have defined aggravated rape as where the female resisted to the utmost and her resistance was overcome by force or where the victim
was quite young, while other forms of rape were considered simple
60
rape. Penalties for the two forms differed considerably, with aggra61
vated rape often exposing the offender to the death penalty. Some
62
states subdivided the crime even further. For example, New York
created a classification of misdemeanor rape that applies when the

53

See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-6-66 (West, Westlaw through 2009 Sess.); CAL. PENAL
CODE § 243.4 (West, Westlaw through 2009 legislation); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-42-4-8
(West, Westlaw through 2009 1st Spec. Sess.); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:14-2 (West 2005).
54
C.P. art. 609.
55
See infra notes 94–108 and accompanying text.
56
MODEL PENAL CODE & COMMENTARIES § 213.1 cmt. 1 (1980).
57
Id.
58
Id.
59
Id.
60
Id.
61
Id.; Raymond T. Bye, Recent History and Present Status of Capital Punishment in the
United States, 17 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 234, 241–42 (1926) (noting that in 1925,
18 states and the federal government authorized capital punishment for the rape of
an adult female).
62
MODEL PENAL CODE & COMMENTARIES § 213.1 cmt. 1.
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female is under the age of consent and the male is under twenty-one
63
years old.
American jurisdictions typically enumerated other sexual of64
fenses, including sodomy.
The pattern regarding sodomy laws
65
around the country varied a bit more than did ordinary rape law.
Additionally, provisions outlawing “crimes against nature” often included both consensual and non-consensual behavior and both ho66
mosexual and heterosexual conduct. Despite a marital exemption
from rape laws, some jurisdictions criminalized oral and anal copula67
tion even between spouses.
While state law prohibited a wide variety of sexual behavior, sexual touching that did not involve penetration was not criminalized as
68
a sexual crime, with limited exceptions such as cunnilingus. Most
69
crimes required at least penetration with the penis. Sexual battery
did not exist, except for assault with intent to rape or to commit sod70
omy. Instead, exotic touching might have been treated as an as71
sault, but jurisdictions did not have a distinct sexual assault offense.
72
By the end of the twentieth century, a good deal had changed.
Two major factors explain the changes in American law governing
substantive sexual offenses. The first factor in the development of
73
American criminal law was the publication of the Model Penal Code.
The second and more important factor was the influence of the
74
women’s rights movement on sexual offender laws.
Some commentators are critical of the Model Penal Code’s ap75
proach to sex crimes. Indeed, one commentator has argued that
76
the Code’s provisions “should be pulled and replaced.” For exam-

63

Id.
Id. § 213.2 cmt. 1.
65
See, e.g., id. § 213.2 cmt. 1 n.5.
66
Id. § 213.2 cmt. 1.
67
Id.
68
MODEL PENAL CODE & COMMENTARIES §§ 213.2, 213.4 cmt. 1.
69
Id. § 213.4 cmt. 1.
70
Id. § 213.4 n.80.
71
Id.
72
LAFAVE, supra note 51, at 847–50 (4th ed. 2003) (contrasting the traditional
and modern approaches to rape).
73
See discussion infra notes 82–86 and accompanying text.
74
See discussion infra notes 87–92 and accompanying text.
75
See, e.g., Deborah W. Denno, Why the Model Penal Code’s Sexual Offender Provisions
Should Be Pulled and Replaced, 1 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 207 (2003).
76
Id. at 207.
64
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ple, it left in place the marital exemption from rape. The Code also
reduced the degree of the felony under certain circumstances, such
as when the woman was a “voluntary social companion” who had pre78
viously allowed the man “sexual liberties.” For some offenses, the
79
Code made the woman’s prior promiscuity an affirmative defense.
Further, it kept in place a requirement that the victim make a prompt
80
complaint. Finally, it provided that no one may be convicted of a
felony under the sexual offenses provision unless the victim’s testi81
mony is corroborated.
Despite these shortcomings, the Model Penal Code recognized a
82
distinct offense of sexual assault. The gravamen of the offense was
“sexual contact” with another when the perpetrator knows that the
contact was offensive to the other person (or, which occurred in a variety of settings, such as where the perpetrator knows that his victim is
83
unaware of the sexual act or the victim is under a certain age). The
Code defines “sexual contact” in terms of its purpose to arouse or
84
gratify sexual desire. The Code was quite modern in its recognition
that traditional assault was inadequate to protect the distinct interest
at stake when the touching was sexual in nature. The offense is de85
signed to protect against “an invasion of individual dignity.” As the
comments indicate, this provision of the Code has been influential,
with many states adopting a sexual offense distinct from traditional
86
assault.
The more important influence on substantive sex offenses was
the women’s rights movement. Significant reforms began during the
87
1970s. As I have summarized elsewhere,
Those reforms include the elimination of the spousal immunity in
many jurisdictions, the elimination of special cautionary instructions and the corroboration requirement, and the elimination of
the requirement of resistance or, at least, the elimination of the

77

See id. at 213.
MODEL PENAL CODE & COMMENTARIES § 213.1 cmt. 2 (1980).
79
Id. § 213.6(3).
80
Id. § 213.6(4).
81
Id.
82
Id. § 213.4.
83
Id.
84
MODEL PENAL CODE & COMMENTARIES § 213.4 cmt. 2.
85
Id. § 213.4 cmt. 1.
86
Id.
87
Michael Vitiello, Punishing Sex Offenders: When Good Intentions Go Bad, 40 ARIZ.
ST. L. J. 651, 657 (2008).
78
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requirement of resistance to the utmost. Further, . . . in some instances reforms expanded the conduct that is criminal and limited the mens rea requirements for rape. Those reforms were
sometimes the product of legislative enactment or judicial inter88
pretation of existing rape law.

Those reforms reflect a major rethinking about the nature of
sexual offenses.
No longer is rape conceived of as a crime of violence. Instead, it
is an invasion of a woman’s “inner space,” of her privacy and her au89
tonomy. Whereas sex offenses arose in an era that discouraged sexual autonomy outside marriage, modern sex law values and protects
90
it. While debate continues as to whether reforms have gone far
91
enough, one can find numerous cases prosecuted today that would
92
have gone without a remedy as recently as thirty years ago. In some
instances, prosecutors would have refused to prosecute, but in many
other instances, the legal requirements made prosecution impossible.
Once the law recognizes the importance of sexual autonomy,
adoption of a sexual assault statute is a logical gap-filling extension of
the law. For example, a statute might provide for a lesser-included
offense for situations where a jury might not want to convict a defendant of rape, such as perhaps in a case of date rape. Further, a sexual
assault statute serves to distinguish sexual assault from, for example, a
fight between two men. Instead, the crime focuses on the sexual nature of the touching and underscores that certain kinds of touching
are of a different order from a punch in the nose. Sexual groping offends one’s dignity and sense of selfhood, even if not necessarily
93
one’s physical safety.
88

Id.
DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 51, at § 33.03[2] .
90
Id.; see also Anne M. Coughlin, Sex and Guilt, 84 VA. L. REV. 1, 6 (1998).
91
See, e.g., STEPHEN J. SCHULHOFER, UNWANTED SEX: THE CULTURE OF INTIMIDATION
AND THE FAILURE OF LAW ix, 10 (1998). Part of the problem is cultural and not legal.
Even when the criminal law has expanded to allow the conviction of an actor,
“[s]ocial attitudes are tenacious, and they can easily nullify the theories and doctrines found in the law books.” Id. at 17; see also Joshua Dressler, Where We Have Been,
and Where We Might Be Going: Some Cautionary Reflections on Rape Law Reform, 46 CLEV.
ST. L. REV. 409, 410 (1998) (“[F]eminists can take legitimate pride in the fact that
rape law has undergone significant reform in just the past decade or two, largely as a
result of their efforts.”).
92
See Vitiello, supra note 87, at 651–52 (describing some of the changes in the law
that have made prosecution for rape more likely today both substantively and practically).
93
See MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.4 (1980) (defining any sexual contact as “any
touching of the sexual or other intimate parts of the person for the purpose of arousing or gratifying sexual desire”).
89
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B. State Sexual Assault Law Today and How It Would Apply to G.G.
and A.M.
Most modern jurisdictions have adopted some form of sexual assault statute, including all of the jurisdictions examined for this Ar94
ticle. For example, Alabama’s code includes a sexual abuse statute,
criminalizing the act of subjecting another person to sexual conduct
95
by forcible compulsion. The statute defines “sexual conduct” as any
touching done for the purpose of gratifying the sexual desire of ei96
ther party. The Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals has interpreted
the statute to include touching of intimate parts of the body, which is
interpreted to mean any part of the body that a reasonable person
97
would consider “private.”
Indiana’s sexual battery statute contains a provision similar to
Alabama’s law. It punishes “a person, who with intent to arouse or
satisfy the person’s own sexual desires or the sexual desires of another person, touches another person when that person is . . . compelled
98
to submit to the touching by force or the imminent threat of force.”
New Jersey has a similar named offense of sexual assault, but it is
implicated when an actor commits an act of sexual contact with a victim “less than 13 years old and the actor is at least four years older
99
than the victim.” The New Jersey statute also includes a lesser of100
fense of criminal sexual contact. It occurs when one commits “an
act of sexual contact with the victim” under various circumstances,
including those in which the actor uses physical force or coercion,
101
but the victim does not sustain severe injuries. Sexual contact is defined broadly to include “an intentional touching by the victim or actor, either directly or through the clothing, of the victim’s or actor’s
intimate parts for the purpose of degrading or humiliating the victim
102
The law deor sexually arousing or sexually gratifying the actor.”

94
See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-6-66 (West, Westlaw through 2009 Sess.); CAL. PENAL
CODE § 243.4 (West, Westlaw through 2009 legislation); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-42-4-8
(West, Westlaw through 2009 1st Spec. Sess.); N.J. STAT. ANN. §2 C:14-2 (West 2005).
95
ALA. CODE § 13A-6-66 (West, Westlaw through 2009 Sess.).
96
Id. § 13A-6-60(3).
97
Parker v. State, 406 So. 2d 1036, 1038–39 (Ala. Crim. App. 1981).
98
IND. CODE ANN. § 35-42-4-8(a)(1).
99
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:14-2(b).
100
Id. § 2C:14-3.
101
Id.
102
Id. § 2C:14-1(d).
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fines “intimate parts” as including the “sexual organs, genital areas,
103
anal area, inner thigh, groin, buttock or breast of a person.”
California includes a misdemeanor sexual battery offense that
104
appears broader than the laws of Alabama, Indiana, and New Jersey.
In California, misdemeanor sexual battery is committed when a person “touches an intimate part” of another person and the touching is
“against the will of the person touched, and is for the specific pur105
pose of sexual arousal, sexual gratification, or sexual abuse.” California defines “intimate part” as the sex organs, anus, groin, or but106
Further, the
tocks of any person, and the breast of a female.
107
touching may be direct or through the clothing of either party. Unlike the other states canvassed, California does not require forcible
108
compulsion.
This distinction is extremely important in situations
where, for example, an offender grabs his victim without any independent threat or forcible act beyond the sexual touching itself.
Courts in Indiana have faced the question of what constitutes
forcible compulsion. In 1991, the Indiana Supreme Court found insufficient evidence of force in a case in which the defendant grabbed
a co-worker’s buttocks and announced that he had received a “free
109
feel.” In finding the evidence insufficient to support the conviction
for touching by force, the court observed that not all unwanted
110
touching constitutes touching by force.
More recently, an Indiana appellate court distinguished Scott111
112
Gordon. In Bailey v. State, the court upheld the offender’s conviction. The court focused on additional facts that it found relevant:
Bailey had previously asked if he could come home with her and
113
“pull down her pants,” and the victim previously witnessed Bailey
114
masturbating in a park. Additionally, the victim had made clear to

103

Id. § 2C:14-1(e).
CAL. PENAL CODE § 243.4 (West, Westlaw through 2009 legislation).
105
Id. § 243.4(e)(1).
106
Id. § 243.4(g)(1).
107
Id. § 243.4(e)(2).
108
Compare id. § 243.4 with ALA. CODE § 13A-6-66 (West, Westlaw through 2009
Sess.) and IND. CODE ANN. § 35-42-4-8 (West, Westlaw through 2009 1st Spec. Sess.).
109
Scott-Gordon v. State, 579 N.E.2d 602, 604 (Ind. 1991).
110
Id.
111
Bailey v. State, 764 N.E.2d 728, 730–31 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002).
112
Id. at 729.
113
Id.
114
Id. at 730.
104
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115

Bailey that she wanted him to leave her alone.
That sufficed to
116
show that Bailey forced his victim to submit to his touching. While
the court did not explicitly frame it this way, the opinion suggested
that as long as the defendant is on notice that his advances are unwelcome, subsequent contact will satisfy the force element.
The court went further, holding in the alternative that imminent
threat of force element was met because sexual battery should be
judged from the perspective of the victim when a fact finder is “determining whether the presence or absence of forceful compulsion
117
existed.” Judged from this perspective, the court found that the vic118
tim had a reason to fear Bailey.
Bailey’s gross misconduct notwithstanding, the appellate court’s
119
decision is open to criticism, as the dissent points out. The dissent
summed up the most obvious problem with the majority’s approach
as follows:
[B]ailey simply ran from behind Adams and grabbed or touched
her on the buttocks. The record is void of any evidence that
Adams was even aware of Bailey’s approaching her from behind
before the touching occurred, let alone that she was compelled or
120
forced by Bailey to submit to the touching.

Other courts have faced a similar interpretive problem in a
121
122
closely related context. Both the New Jersey and California Supreme Courts have had to resolve whether an offender commits rape
or, in New Jersey, “forcible sexual assault,” which requires “an act of
123
sexual penetration,” when the only act of force is the force inherent
in the act of intercourse itself. In a widely reported case, a unanimous New Jersey Supreme Court effectively read “force” out of its sta124
tute. In M.T.S., a seventeen-year-old boy engaged in heavy petting
with a fifteen-year-old girl, resulting in an act of penetration to which
125
the girl did not consent. The juvenile court found the boy guilty of
forcible sexual assault despite the absence of any force beyond that
115
116
117
118
119
120
121
122
123
124
125

Id. at 729–30.
Id. at 731.
Bailey, 764 N.E.2d at 731.
Id. at 732.
See id. at 732–33 (Darden, J., dissenting).
Id. at 733.
See State ex rel. M.T.S., 609 A.2d 1266, 1269–70 (N.J. 1992).
See People v. Griffin, 94 P.3d 1089, 1094 (Cal. 2004).
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:14-2(c)(1) (West 2005).
See M.T.S., 609 A.2d at 1277.
See id. at 1267–68.
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126

inherent in the act of intercourse itself. Notwithstanding the inclusion of a force element and the absence of a consent element in the
statute, the New Jersey Supreme Court found that the necessary force
is met whenever a person achieves penetration in the absence of af127
firmative and freely-given permission.
California did not go as far
as New Jersey in reducing the force element and conflating it with
consent. But in rape cases, the California Supreme Court has held
that nothing in the term “force” suggests that the necessary force for
rape must be “substantially different from or substantially greater than”
128
the force normally inherent in sexual intercourse.
While both of these cases involved penetration as opposed to the
other sexual touching present in the two Italian cases discussed
above, they remain informative and relevant. They may lend some
guidance on how a court would interpret the force element in sexual
battery cases where the sexual battery includes sexual touching without penetration. Prior to the late twentieth century and the adoption
of sexual assault offenses, it is doubtful that American law would have
been broad enough to cover the kind of conduct in the two Italian
129
cases.
That said, modern sexual assault statutes appear broad enough
to include A.M.’s slap on the buttocks as a prohibited act of sexual assault. Such an act seems like the kind of invasion of one’s privacy
and individual dignity that the Model Penal Code targeted in its sexual
130
assault offense. This kind of touching comes within the definition
131
of sexual contact set out in all four of the statutes canvassed above.
For example, under Alabama law, a slap on the buttocks would constitute “sexual conduct,” or touching “done for the purpose of grati132
fying the sexual desire of either party.” Almost certainly, the touching of the buttocks would come within the Alabama Court of
Criminal Appeals’s holding that the statute includes the touching of
126

See id. at 1269.
Id. at 1277.
128
People v. Griffin, 94 P.3d 1089, 1094 (Cal. 2004).
129
A question posted on the Criminal Law professors’ listserv, asking whether anyone was aware of a case like that of G.G. or A.M., produced no similar cases with the
exception of one instance discussed below (involving a juvenile victim). See infra
notes 156–177 and accompanying text.
130
See MODEL PENAL CODE & COMMENTARIES § 213.4 cmt. 1 (1980).
131
See ALA. CODE § 13A-6-60(3) (West, Westlaw through 2009 Sess.); CAL. PENAL
CODE § 243.4(e)(1) (West, Westlaw through 2009 Sess.); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-42-4-8
(West, Westlaw through 2009 1st Spec. Sess.); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:14-1(d) (West
2005).
132
See ALA. CODE § 13A-6-60(3).
127
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any part of the body that a reasonable person would consider “pri133
The other statutes reviewed above also cover this situation.
vate.”
The touching of intimate body parts is included in both the Califor134
nia and New Jersey statutes.
Further, both of them include some
reference to sexual gratification; that is, the touching is sexually driven and not, for example, a congratulatory pat on the buttocks com135
mon among coaches and athletes. The element of sexual gratification would be proven, as in A.M.’s case, by the specific context in
which the touching took place.
It is more difficult to ascertain whether the required element of
force would be met under Alabama, Indiana, and New Jersey law.
California’s law seems most obviously met: it requires only that the
136
touching be against the will of the person touched, a fact that can
be inferred from context as well as from the victim’s testimony. The
California law also includes the buttocks within its definition of the
137
“intimate part” of the other person’s body. As the Scott-Gordon and
Bailey cases demonstrate, Indiana law requires something more than a
mere grabbing of the buttocks. In addition to the lack of consent,
the state must also show some element of force or threat of force.
The Bailey court found the threat of force element satisfied by past
acts generating fear in the victim and by conduct judged from the vic138
tim’s perspective, but the dissent highlighted difficulties with this
139
approach.
Similarly, a court in Alabama would have to determine
whether the offense requires any force in addition to the sexual act
itself. Absent a prosecution for the kind of conduct involved in
A.M.’s case, one can only speculate how the New Jersey courts would
resolve the question.
The case law is limited in this area. As Bailey and M.T.S. demonstrate (or in the case of M.T.S., at least in the context of a crime similar to rape), some courts have been willing to read force expansively.
But both Bailey and M.T.S. are open to criticism on statutory con140
struction grounds.
Their broad reading of statutory elements to
133

See Parker v. State, 406 So. 2d 1036, 1039 (Ala. Crim. App. 1981).
CAL. PENAL CODE § 243.4(e)(1); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:14-1(d).
135
MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.4 cmt. 2 (1980).
136
CAL. PENAL CODE § 243.4(e)(1).
137
Id. § 243.4(g)(1).
138
Bailey v. State, 764 N.E.2d 728, 731–32 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002).
139
Id. at 732–33 (Darden, J., dissenting).
140
After all, the New Jersey legislature avoided using the term consent and instead
used the element of force as the gravamen of the offense. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:142(c) (West 2005). The court’s interpretation turned this upside down. See State ex rel
134
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protect the underlying policy of the statute might lead a court to resolve any uncertainty against the offender in a case like A.M.’s, especially in light of his prior history of inappropriate sexual behavior.
No doubt, the relative employment status of A.M. and his victims
might also be deemed relevant to the force inherent in the situa141
tion.
G.G.’s case presents a more questionable situation. An unwanted kiss would not appear to qualify as a sufficient touching under
California or New Jersey law. The California statute requires the of142
fender to touch “an intimate part” of another person. But California defines this term as including “the sexual organ, anus, groin, or
143
California’s
buttocks of any person, and the breast of a female.”
failure to mention the lips or neck as an intimate part of the body
would seem sufficient to prevent GG from qualifying under the law.
144
Similar restrictions appear in New Jersey’s statute.
Less clear is whether a kiss might be a sufficient touching under
Alabama and Indiana law. As indicated above, in Alabama, a sex offense is committed when a person “subjects another person to sexual
145
conduct by forcible compulsion.” The statute defines “sexual conduct” as requiring touching for the purpose of “gratifying the sexual
146
The Alabama appellate court has defined
desire of either party.”
“intimate parts” as “any part of the body which a reasonable person
147
One might argue that the lips are an inwould consider private.”
timate part of the body, but reported cases in Alabama interpreting
the “intimate parts” language have not involved cases where the conduct was as limited as kissing. For example, in one reported case, the
defendant touched a fully clothed woman on her breastbone in a
148
public place.
In another case, while pressing his knees on the
woman’s knees to pin her down, the defendant reached under the

M.T.S., 609 A.2d 1266, 1276–77 (N.J. 1992); see also Bailey, 764 N.E.2d at 733 (Darden, J., dissenting) (suggesting the difficulty with the majority’s interpretation of the
element of force).
141
Cf. Bailey, 764 N.E.2d at 733 (Darden, J., dissenting) (discussing the relevance
of an employer-employee relationship in a finding of force or threat of force).
142
CAL. PENAL CODE § 243.4(e)(1) (West, Westlaw through 2009 Sess.).
143
Id. § 243.4(g)(1).
144
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:14-1(d)–(e).
145
ALA. CODE § 13A-6-66(a)(1) (West, Westlaw through 2009 Sess.).
146
Id. § 13A-6-60(3).
147
See, e.g., Hutcherson v. State, 441 So. 2d 1048, 1052 (Ala. Crim. App. 1983)
(quoting Parker v. State, 406 So. 2d 1036, 1039 (Ala. Crim. App. 1981)).
148
Hutcherson, 441 So. 2d at 1049.
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victim’s dress and touched her thighs and stomach.
Obviously, a
kiss can certainly be intended as an attempt to gratify one’s sexual
desire or to arouse it in the other person, but research uncovered no
reported cases where Alabama courts had to resolve the question.
Indiana law presents the same legal issues as Alabama law. Its
sexual battery offense, described above, requires a touching done
with an “intent to arouse or satisfy the person’s own sexual desires or
150
the sexual desires of another person.” As with the Alabama statute,
in a case involving a kiss, a court would have to decide whether the
kiss was done with the requisite intent to arouse.
A harder question would be whether a kiss constitutes sufficient
force to satisfy the elements of sexual battery. Here, the inquiry
above arises again. Whether a simple kiss, even an unexpected kiss,
can be considered forcible raises the question of whether something
more than the force inherent in the sexual act is required for a finding of force. In cases like Bailey and M.T.S., courts have found that
151
no other force is necessary.
For example, in M.T.S., the court
found that the defendant was guilty of rape based on the force necessary for the act of intercourse, but stipulated that the holding applies
only when a reasonable person would be on notice that he lacked the
152
other person’s consent. This may not be present in a case of a simple kiss. In Bailey, the two-judge majority found that the necessary
force or threat of force was present because of a prior history between the victim and the defendant, which gave the victim a reason to
fear the defendant on the particular occasion of his unwanted touch153
ing.
G.G.’s case involved somewhat more force than that involved in
a kiss. In resisting the defendant’s kiss, the victim pulled away from
154
After that, he again
him and placed her hand over his mouth.
155
grabbed the victim and kissed her neck. Under both Alabama and
Indiana law, a court faced with the facts of G.G.’s case would have to
determine whether the defendant’s act of continuing to attempt to
kiss the victim after she placed her hand over his mouth and signaled
her disapproval constituted sufficient force under the law. In what149

Parker, 406 So. 2d at 1038.
IND. CODE ANN. § 35-42-4-8 (West, Westlaw through 2009 1st Spec. Sess.).
151
See Bailey v. State, 764 N.E.2d 728, 732 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002); State ex rel M.T.S.,
609 A.2d 1266, 1278–79 (N.J. 1992).
152
M.T.S., 609 A.2d at 1277.
153
Bailey, 764 N.E.2d at 732.
154
Cass. pen., sez. III, 26 jan. 2006, n.19808, Guida al Diritto, n. 37, 2006, 89.
155
Id.
150
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ever manner the courts were to resolve the issue, it would be harder
for the defendant to argue that he did not use force as compared to a
case in which his only act was an initial unwanted kiss.
Research did not reveal a case in any of the four jurisdictions
surveyed where the state brought a prosecution based solely on a kiss.
The closest case, located through a posting on a Criminal Law profes156
157
sor listserv, was from Oregon. State v. Rodriguez involved a female
158
defendant convicted of first degree sexual abuse, an offense calling
for a mandatory minimum punishment of seventy-five months in
159
160
prison.
Rodriguez worked with at-risk youths.
She was twentyfour years old when she began working at the facility where she met
161
the twelve-year-old victim. She became closely involved in the life of
162
the victim and his family.
Rumors circulated about the close rela163
They frequently
tionship between the victim and defendant.
hugged and the defendant often put her arm around the boy when
164
they walked together. She allowed him to sit on her lap and he of165
ten kissed her on the cheek.
E-mails they exchanged confessed
166
Further, they took trips together, intheir love for one another.
167
cluding two overnight trips.
They were also frequently alone to168
gether, including in the defendant’s apartment.
In the absence of any evidence of intercourse, the sexual abuse
charge was based on a single brief encounter between the two partic-

156
See State v. Rodriguez, 174 P.3d 1100 (Or. Ct. App. 2007), rev’d in part 217 P.3d
659 (Or. 2009). My thanks to Ohio State Law Professor Doug Berman for bringing
my attention to this case and for his extremely helpful blog, Sentencing Law and Policy. See generally Sentencing Law and Policy, http://sentencing.typepad.com/ (last
visited Feb. 12, 2010).
157
Rodriguez, 174 P.3d at 1101.
158
OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 163.427(1)(a)(A) (West, Westlaw through 2009 Sess.).
159
Id. § 137.700(2)(a)(P). The severe punishment was part of a ballot measure
approved by Oregon voters. State v. Skelton, 957 P.2d 585, 590 n.6 (Or. Ct. App.
1998). As many scholars have written, ballot measures are a poor way to determine
criminal sentences.
See, e.g., FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING ET AL., PUNISHMENT AND
DEMOCRACY: THREE STRIKES AND YOU’RE OUT IN CALIFORNIA passim (2001).
160
Rodriguez, 174 P.3d at 1101.
161
Id.
162
Id.
163
Id.
164
Id.
165
Id.
166
Rodriguez, 174 P.3d at 1101.
167
Id.
168
Id.
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169

ipants. The act of first degree sexual abuse consisted of the following conduct, lasting approximately one minute:
On February 14, 2005, a staff member named Villalobos saw defendant and the victim in the game room at the club. There were
approximately 30 to 50 youths and at least one other staff member in the room. The victim, who had since turned 13, was sitting
on a chair. Defendant, who had since turned 25, was standing
behind him, caressing his face and pulling his head back; the
back of his head was pressed against her breasts. Villalobos
crossed the room and pointed defendant and the victim out to
Malunay, another staff member, who had his back to them. Malunay turned and saw defendant run her hands along the victim’s
face and through his hair while the back of his head was against
170
her breasts.

The jury had to find that the defendant’s conduct amounted to
sexual contact, defined as “any touching of the sexual or other intimate parts . . . for the purpose of arousing or gratifying the sexual de171
Despite the limited amount of time involved
sire of either party.”
in the encounter, the defendant did not challenge the sufficiency of
172
the evidence of sexual contact. Instead, the issue in the trial court,
which found in her favor, and in the Oregon appellate court, was
whether the mandatory minimum sentence of seventy-five months
173
was cruel and unusual because it was disproportionate. The appellate court reversed the trial court and found that the sentence would
not “shock the moral sense of all reasonable people as to what is right
174
and proper under the circumstances.”
Not only did the court have before it the absence of a claim of
sufficiency of the evidence, but it also did not think that the issue was,
when viewed in the abstract, that the defendant’s conduct was so mi175
nor that the sentence would have been excessive. Instead, the court
focused on all of the circumstances, including the nature of the relationship between the defendant and victim (the victim, a young atrisk child, and the defendant, an adult in a position of trust and re-

169
170
171
172
173
174
175

Id. at 1101–02.
Id.
OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 163.305(6) (West, Westlaw through 2009 Sess.).
Rodriguez, 174 P.3d at 1103.
Id. at 1103–05.
Id. at 1106.
Id. at 1105–06.
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sponsibility, which the court concluded involved a serious abuse of
176
trust).
Even this case is not as extreme as G.G.’s two kisses. Rodriguez
presents the special problem of sexual conduct in the context of an
adult-child relationship, even if the sexual roles are reversed from the
more stereotypical situation of an older male offender and a young
female victim. Further, although not explicit in the court’s opinion,
a full reading of the opinion suggests that the judges assumed that
the defendant and the victim had engaged in much more inappro177
priate conduct, probably sexual intercourse. Thus, this is not a case
in which a brief caress, without more, gave rise to criminal liability.
C. Punishment Under State Sexual Assault Law
Before discussing the normative question, whether the Italian
approach is sound, one must address what kind of punishment G.G.
or A.M. might face if convicted of sex offenses under American law.
178
In Alabama, sexual abuse is a Class C felony with a penalty of
imprisonment for not less than one year and one day and not more
179
than ten years. A sex offender is required to register for the crime
180
of sexual abuse and is limited with whom he or she can live. A person convicted of certain offenses, including sexual battery, must register with the sheriff in the county of his or her residence and re181
register if he or she moves to another county. Further, unlike some
more draconian state laws, the Alabama registry of sex offenders is
182
open only to law enforcement officers and agencies.
In California, the punishment for misdemeanor sexual battery
may not exceed two thousand dollars or six months in county jail,
183
with higher penalties if the offender was the victim’s employer.
The California Penal Code requires the registration of every person
convicted of specified felony sex offenses, as well as other offenses de-

176

Id. at 1106.
See id. at 1101 (“Defendant took the victim with her on several trips to Bend
and Spokane, [including two] overnight trips. The two were frequently alone together in her car, at her apartment, and at his home. They were seen alone together
in her office at the club with the door closed.”).
178
ALA. CODE § 13A-6-66 (West, Westlaw through 2009 Sess.).
179
Id.§ 13A-5-6(a)(3).
180
Id.§ 13A-11-204(b).
181
Id.§ 13A-11-200.
182
Id.§ 13A-11-202.
183
CAL. PENAL CODE § 243.4(e)(1) (West, Westlaw through 2009 legislation).
177
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184

fined in the code. In California, offenders who commit sexual bat185
tery or child sexual abuse are subject to registration requirements.
The offender must register as long as the offender lives in Califor186
nia. The offender must register with the chief of police of the city
“within five working days of coming into, or changing . . . residence”
187
The offender must register annually,
or location within the city.
within five working days of his or her birthday, to update his or her
registration, providing his or her name, address, temporary location,
and place of employment including the name and address of the
188
employer. Even more recently, as the result of an ill-conceived bal189
lot initiative, California has added a requirement that an offender
190
convicted of a “registerable sex offense” must submit to GPS moni191
toring for any term of parole. Further, California’s Department of
Justice maintains a publicly accessible Web site that provides exten192
sive data about each registrant.
If these acts qualify as sexual battery in Indiana, the punishment
would be imprisonment from six months to three years, with the advi193
sory sentence being one and one-half years.
But Indiana has the
least onerous registration requirement, applicable only if the person
is convicted of child molestation under Indiana Code section 35-42-4194
3.
In New Jersey, a person convicted of sexual assault is also subject
195
The registrant may file a motion to be removed
to registration.
184

22 WEST’S CAL. JUR. 3D § 44 (2009).
See CAL. PENAL CODE § 290 (describing registration requirements for persons
convicted of sexual abuse under section 243.4 and for persons convicted under section 288 of lewd and lascivious behavior with a child under the age of fourteen).
186
WEST’S CAL. JUR. 3D, supra note 184.
187
Id.
188
See CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 290, 290.012, 290.015.
189
Bill Ainsworth, Law to Boost Sex Offender Monitoring Falling Short, SAN DIEGO
UNION-TRIBUNE, Feb. 14, 2008, at A1, available at http://www.signonsandiego.com/
uniontrib/20080214/news_1n14jessica.html.
190
A “registerable sex offense” is one that requires registration under California
Penal Code section 290(c). CAL. PENAL CODE § 3000.07 (West, Westlaw through 2009
legislation).
191
Id. § 3000.07(a).
192
Id. § 290.4; see also Vitiello, supra note 87, at 668–74 (providing a detailed discussion of the various registration requirements under California law).
193
IND. CODE ANN. § 35-50-2-7 (West, Westlaw through 2009 legislation). In Indiana sexual battery is a Class D felony barring aggravated circumstances. Id. § 35-42-48(a).
194
Id. § 35-42-4-11.
195
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:7-2 (West 2005 & Supp. 2008).
185
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from the New Jersey State Registry if fifteen years have passed since
196
the offender’s last offense.
The expansion of substantive sex offenses has occurred separately from the expansion of criminal penalties and other disabilities, like
197
registration requirements.
The former, as in Italy, was driven by
feminist concerns about the insensitivity of the law to women’s
198
The expansion of penalties, by contrast, has been an overplight.
heated reaction to the infrequent abduction and murder of young
children, with resulting penalties applying far beyond the pathologi199
cal sexual predator.
Thus, were G.G. or A.M. convicted in an American jurisdiction,
they might be subject to a wide variety of punishments and other disabilities, depending on the degree of the offense. Certainly, as indicated above, convicting A.M. is more plausible today than would be
convicting G.G.
200

IV. DO THE ITALIANS (OR THE AMERICANS) HAVE IT RIGHT?
201

202

Should A.M.’s and G.G.’s conduct be criminalized? With regard to A.M., I have considerable ambivalence but believe unequivocally that G.G.’s conduct should not be criminal.
I should start with an admission and my first lesson as someone
engaging in comparative law. Despite over thirty years of legal scholarship, this is my first comparative law article. My first lesson is no
doubt obvious to any comparativist: comparing specific cases is uninformed unless one looks at the larger context—here, at the entire
justice system. For example, as I develop below, much of my hesitation about criminalizing both A.M. and G.G. derives from analyzing
both punishment of sex offenders in the United States and alternative remedies, including civil suits and workplace regulations, to deal
effectively with unwanted sexual behavior.
As indicated above, broadly worded sexual assault statutes might
203
encompass A.M.’s behavior.
But finding analogous cases is prob-

196
197
198
199
200

Id. § 2C:7-2(f).
See Vitiello, supra note 87, at 651.
Id. at 655–58.
Id. at 674–85.
That is, according to Professor Vitiello, do the Italians or Americans have it

right?
201
202
203

See supra Part II.B.
See supra Part II.A.
See supra notes 130–139 and accompanying text.
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lematic. The two closest cases, both from Indiana, Bailey v. State and
205
Scott-Gordon v. State, suggest some of the legal issues that a prosecutor might face in a case like A.M.’s. Not all jurisdictions have an offense as broadly defined as California’s misdemeanor sexual battery,
206
Instead, many
which criminalizes any unwanted sexual touching.
207
jurisdictions, like Indiana, require an element of force.
In Scott208
Gordon, the Indiana Supreme Court recognized that the simple act
of slapping a person’s buttocks did not include a separate act of
force. In Bailey, an Indiana appellate court distinguished Scott209
Gordon. In a somewhat strained reading of the state statute, the appellate court found the “force” element satisfied because of prior
contact between the victim and defendant that put him on notice
210
that his conduct was against her will.
No doubt A.M.’s conduct would amount to battery and, in the
jurisdictions that have it, something akin to California’s misdemeanor sexual battery offense. But whether he should be guilty under
211
212
213
statutes like those in Indiana, New Jersey, or Alabama is a much
harder question. The court in Bailey strained to find the force element satisfied, although it did so in a case which featured a troubling
set of facts: Bailey had accosted the victim on prior occasions, includ214
ing one in which the victim saw him masturbating.
Nevertheless,
extending liability for “forcible” assault, without any act of force
beyond the force of the sexual act itself, violates traditional principles
of statutory construction, especially in criminal cases, where Ameri215
can courts typically follow the principle of lenity.
Such a strained
reading of the statute, whereby the court borders on substituting its
judgment for that of the legislature, also raises questions of separation of powers.
204

764 N.E.2d 728 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002).
579 N.E.2d 602 (Ind. 1991).
206
CAL. PENAL CODE § 243.4(e)(1) (West, Westlaw through 2009 legislation).
207
IND. CODE ANN. § 35-42-4-8 (West, Westlaw through 2009 legislation).
208
Scott-Gordon, 579 N.E.2d at 604.
209
Bailey, 764 N.E.2d at 731–32.
210
Id. at 732.
211
IND. CODE ANN. § 35-42-4-8 (West, Westlaw through 2009 legislation).
212
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:14-3 (West 2005 & Supp. 2008).
213
ALA. CODE § 13A-6-66 (West, Westlaw through 2009 Sess.).
214
Bailey, 764 N.E.2d at 730.
215
See, e.g., United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 347–48 (1971); see also Zachary
Price, The Rule of Lenity as a Rule of Structure, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 885, 885 (2004) (stating that the rule of lenity “directs courts to construe statutory ambiguities in favor of
criminal defendants”).
205
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Statutory interpretation aside, the far harder question is whether
A.M. should be considered a sexual offender. Absent criminal liability, an offender like A.M. might be subject to civil liability in the United States. Thus, the victims might readily seek civil damages for bat216
tery, including punitive damages, thereby providing deterrence and
punishment for the offender. In addition, although such cases are
few and far between, A.M. might be subject to criminal charges for
217
simple battery.
My hesitation in extending sexual offender laws (beyond, perhaps, misdemeanor sexual battery, like California’s law) is based on
the extreme penalties and collateral consequences of a finding that a
person is a sex offender. While I recognize that A.M’s behavior is distinct from a traditional battery because it implicates his victims’ sexual autonomy, I remain troubled by A.M.’s case. The expansion of
the law governing rape and related sex offenses, mainly a response to
the feminist movement, took place largely independently of the
218
movement to expand punishments for sex offenders. Punishments
for sex offenders have been driven by gruesome cases that make
headlines in the news, involving offenders with long histories as sex219
ual predators. But the resulting statutes apply broadly, often to offenders who do not represent significant risks of continued miscon220
duct.
Nonetheless, beyond being subject to long prison terms,
these offenders may be subject to lifetime registration requirements,
to having their personal information readily available to anyone who
221
goes online to a state-sponsored Web site, and to restrictions on
where they can live (for example, not within a specified distance from
222
a school or playground).
Does the underlying conduct really deserve the kinds of punishments that are now provided in many state criminal codes? I
223
think not; they are excessive. If such sentences and other disabili216
See, e.g., Fall, 33 F. Supp. 2d at 742; see also Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 31
(1983) (demonstrating the ability to recover punitive damages under 42 U.S.C. §
1983).
217
See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 35-42-2-1 (West, Westlaw through 2009 legislation).
218
See Vitiello, supra note 87, at 653–54.
219
Id. at 667.
220
Id. at 669–72.
221
Id. at 672.
222
Id.
223
Despite the Supreme Court of Georgia’s holding in Humphrey v. Wilson, 652
S.E.2d 501, 510–11 (Ga. 2007), American courts seldom overturn criminal sentences
as excessive. Cf. Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 29–31 (2003) (upholding a sentence of twenty-five years to life in prison for a third felony, a theft offense).
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ties, like registration requirements, are beyond the offenders’ desserts, do they serve other penal purposes? In many cases, they do not.
Harsh penalties for sex offenders have been driven by statistically ab224
errational cases and apply to a wide range of sexual activity not pos225
ing similar grave risks of harm.
Legislatures have enacted sex offender punishments based on misperceptions of the nature of sex
226
offenders and their likely recidivism rates.
Neither adult nor teenage sex offenders constitute wholly homogenous groups, and many
227
do not suffer from sexual pathologies.
Indeed, sex offenders are
228
“relatively unlikely to commit future sexual offenses.” Further, researchers have been able to identify factors that correlate with recidivism, making predictions about the need for incarceration more
229
accurate.
Placing some low-risk offenders in prison may even in230
crease the likelihood that they will re-offend.
224
Cf. LAWRENCE A. GREENFELD, U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE
STATISTICS, SEX OFFENSES AND OFFENDERS: AN ANALYSIS OF DATA ON RAPE AND SEXUAL
ASSAULT 27 (1997), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/soo.pdf
(“Since the latter half of the 1980’s, the percentage of all murders with known circumstances in which rape or other sex offenses have been identified by investigators
as the principal circumstance underlying the murder has been declining from about
2% of murders to less than 1%.”).
225
See, e.g., Humphrey, 652 S.E.2d at 502. But for the court’s disposition of the
case, Wilson, a seventeen-year-old male, would have spent ten years in prison and
been subject to lifetime registration requirements for receiving consensual fellatio
from a fifteen-year-old girl. Id. at 502–03. The underlying conduct—sex between
underage individuals—is remarkably common in the United States. See FRANKLIN E.
ZIMRING, AN AMERICAN TRAVESTY: LEGAL RESPONSES TO ADOLESCENT SEXUAL OFFENDING
52 (2004).
226
See ZIMRING supra note 225, at 28 (stating that “recent legislation and policymaking” are partly based on the assumption that sex offenders specialize in sex offenses, but that “[m]ost repeat criminals are generalists whose criminal histories
comprise a variety of different types of offense[s]”); see also id. at 29 (“When serious
sex offenders are compared with those who commit theft or violent crimes, the prevalence of a distinct pathology is greater among sex offenders, but there is nevertheless substantial heterogeneity in almost every category of severe sex crime.”).
227
Id. at 29.
228
See John F. Stinneford, Incapacitation Through Maiming: Chemical Castration, the
Eighth Amendment, and the Denial of Human Dignity, 3 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 559, 570–72
(2006).
229
See MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING § 1.02(2) cmt. e (Tentative Draft No. 1,
2007) (“[A]ctuarial measures for predicting the risk of recidivism posed by individual
offenders have become more powerful over time.”); R. Karl Hanson & Kelly E. Morton-Bourgon, The Characteristics of Persistent Sexual Offenders: A Meta-Analysis of Recidivism Studies, 73 J. CONSULTING & CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 1154, 1158–59 (2005) (discussing
the “predictors” of sexual recidivism); Edward J. Latessa & Christopher Lowenkamp, What Works in Reducing Recidivism?, 3 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 521, 532–33
(2006) (discussing “[f]our major factors . . . significantly related to recidivism”);
Christopher T. Lowenkamp & Edward J. Latessa, Increasing the Effectiveness of Correc-
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The prosecution of A.M. may have had special significance in Italy, where, at least consistent with the cultural stereotype, men fre231
quently got away with slapping women’s buttocks.
Judges might
have believed that an expansive interpretation of article 609-bis was
justified to make a statement that Italy would no longer tolerate that
kind of behavior. In effect, the judges might have been motivated by
a special need to deter a particular kind of offensive behavior. If that
speculation is correct, American courts would not have a similar motive to send a message about that particular kind of behavior that,
232
while certainly present, is not epidemic among American men.
I am more certain that G.G.’s conduct should not be criminalized. As a simple matter of statutory construction, one can argue
233
that G.G.’s conduct does come within some sexual offense laws.
Further, G.G. violated his victim’s autonomy by attempting to kiss her
twice and attempting to move her head to view the beautiful vistas.
But that hardly ends the inquiry. The concerns that I raised above—
for example, the excessive penalties for sex offenders—are even more
troubling in a case like G.G.’s than in one like A.M.’s. My hesitation
is that an unwanted kiss is likely to arise in too many ambiguous situations to leave the blundering male open to criminal prosecution.
tional Programming Through the Risk Principle: Identifying Offenders for Residential Placement, 4 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 263, 270–71 (2005) (finding that an offender’s
“risk score demonstrate[s] fair predictive validity” of reincarceration and that “recidivism rates increase substantially with each category of risk”); John Monahan, A Jurisprudence of Risk Assessment: Forecasting Harm Among Prisoners, Predators, and Patients, 92
VA. L. REV. 391, 406–08 (2006) (“Recent research . . . indicates that the predictive validity of actuarial [or statistical] instruments has significantly improved in the past
twenty years. . . . In the past several years . . . a number of violence risk assessment
tools have become available . . . .”); Robert A. Prentky et al., Introduction, 989 ANNALS
N.Y. ACAD. SCI. ix, xi (2003) (“[T]here has been a dramatic increase in the development, validation, and revision of risk assessment procedures during the past decade.”); Stinneford, supra note 228, at 570–72 (2006) (discussing the factors associated with increased risk of reoffending based on the findings of studies involving
nearly 60,000 sex offenders).
230
See, e.g., Lowenkamp & Latessa, supra note 229, at 283–84 (finding “substantial”
increases in recidivism rates for low and moderate risk offenders admitted into residential treatment programs and discussing the “importance of studying the different
effects of programs [on] distinct groups of offenders”).
231
See generally Ella Ide, Charm of Italian Men is Lust in Translation, TELEGRAPH
(London), Feb. 14, 2008, at A1, available at http://www.telegraph.co.uk/global/
main.jhtml?xml=/global/2008/02/14/exlustitalia.xml.
232
Lisa Litterio, Beware of the Natives in Italy, THE CRUSADER (College of the Holy
Cross), Nov. 5, 2004, at A1, available at http://media.www.thehccrusader.com/
media/storage/paper568/news/2004/11/05/Features/Beware.Of.The.Natives.In.
Italy-795900.shtml (discussing the more socially aggressive nature of Italian men as
compared to American men).
233
See supra Part IV.
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Thus, G.G. may have believed that his victim was interested in him.
While his victim had to make her lack of consent clear twice, G.G.’s
clumsy attempts seem to have ended once his second kiss was rebuffed, suggesting that he got the point, if belatedly.
Of course, G.G. may have had a mens rea defense; that could be
sufficient to protect him as being a fool, rather than a sex offender.
Mens rea defenses, at least in the United States, are a bit tricky: in
rape cases, where states allow a mistake-of-fact defense, it remains an
affirmative defense, with the burden on the offender to prove that his
234
mistake was reasonable.
That means that a sex offender may be
found guilty based on a civil negligence standard without subjective
awareness of his mistake or without having taken a higher degree of
235
risk than the level needed for civil liability. At the end of the day, I
236
remain convinced that a kiss is just a kiss.
We are at risk of overcriminalizing so many aspects of our lives; at least, short of a strong
need for social protection, we should leave kissing out of the purview
of the criminal law even if it comes within the literal language of
broadly drafted sex offender statutes.
V. TWO NOTEWORTHY AMERICAN CASES
Sexual mores have changed dramatically in the United States
since the 1950s. A majority of teenagers under the age of legal con237
sent are sexually active. Despite that, some prosecutors have shown
an increased interest in pursuing statutory rape cases in recent
238
years. One commentator explains this continued interest in criminal prosecutions as a product of concern about the high number of
239
teen pregnancies.
Others justify the increased use of the criminal
law in sex cases involving minors by reference to concern about the

234

See infra notes 268–272 and accompanying text.
Commonwealth v. Sherry, 437 N.E.2d 224, 233 (Mass. 1982) (“[D]efense of
mistake of fact [for the crime of rape] requires that the accused act in good faith and
with reasonableness.”).
236
I have no doubt that a creative law professor might come up with a bizarre example of a person who dashes about kissing his victims, fully aware that his victims do
not want him to kiss them. Apart from the infrequency of such conduct, I suspect
that even without a specific sex offense, traditional crimes like simple battery can
provide sufficient protection.
237
ZIMRING, supra note 225, at 52–53.
238
Rigel Oliveri, Statutory Rape Law and Enforcement in the Wake of Welfare Reform, 52
STAN. L. REV. 463, 475 (2000).
239
Michelle Oberman, Regulating Consensual Sex with Minors: Defining a Role for Statutory Rape, 48 BUFF. L. REV. 703, 706 (2000).
235
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potential abuse of minors at the hands of adults. Neither of those
concerns explains the first noteworthy case that made headlines in
the United States.
A. Genarlow Wilson
Seventeen-year-old Genarlow Wilson was one of a number of
teenagers who rented adjoining motel rooms for an unsupervised
241
New Year’s Eve party. During the course of the evening, Wilson was
242
videotaped engaging in two sex acts.
The videotape showed him
engaging in intercourse with one girl and an act of fellatio with
243
another girl. Both girls were under the age of consent, resulting in
244
one charge of rape and one count of aggravated child molestation.
At trial, Wilson was acquitted of rape but found guilty of the molestation charge, resulting in a mandatory sentence of ten years in prison
245
without the possibility of parole.
Wilson argued on appeal that the ten-year prison term violated
246
equal protection. Specifically, under Georgia law, a seventeen-yearold who engages in intercourse with a female minor over the age of
247
fourteen would be guilty of a misdemeanor.
By comparison, a seventeen-year-old who engages in an act of sodomy with a minor is
248
guilty of a felony, subject to the mandatory minimum sentence.
249
The Georgia appellate court rejected this argument.
Wilson subsequently filed a habeas corpus petition in state court,
which found that the sentence constituted cruel and unusual pu250
nishment. The state supreme court affirmed the trial court’s finding that the sentence was grossly disproportionate under both the

240

MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.3 cmt. 3 & n.4 (1980).
Wilson v. State, 631 S.E.2d 391, 392 (Ga. Ct. App. 2006).
242
Id.
243
Id.
244
Id.
245
Id.
246
Id. at 392–3.
247
GA. CODE ANN. § 16-6-3(b) (West, Westlaw through 2009); Wilson, 631 S.E.2d at
392–93.
248
Wilson, 631 S.E.2d at 392. The Georgia legislature has amended that provision,
making the seventeen-year-old offender’s conduct a misdemeanor today. See GA.
CODE ANN. § 16-6-4 (West, Westlaw through 2009); H.B. 123, 2009–2010 Leg., Reg.
Sess. (Ga. 2009) (enacted).
249
Wilson, 631 S.E.2d at 393.
250
Humphrey v. Wilson, 652 S.E.2d 501, 502 (Ga. 2007).
241
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Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution and the Geor251
gia Constitution.
Beyond the scope of this Article is whether the holding was consistent with the precedent of the Supreme Court of the United
252
States.
Suffice it to say that many observers undoubtedly were relieved that the court intervened and ordered the release of a young
man whose behavior seemed foolhardy but hardly the kind of serious
253
criminal conduct that should send him to prison for ten years. For
purposes of this Article, the case shows the long prison sentences
254
meted out to some sexual offenders.
B. Kobe Bryant
The second headline case involves National Basketball Association superstar Kobe Bryant, perhaps of special interest to an Italian
audience because he grew up in Italy, where his father, also a former
255
NBA player, resumed his career playing for several Italian teams.
In 2003, the state of Colorado filed a criminal complaint alleging
that Kobe Bryant committed forcible sexual penetration of a woman
256
257
against her will. The episode took place in Bryant’s hotel room.
After a nineteen-year-old hotel employee gave Bryant a tour of the
258
hotel, they went to his room where they engaged in intercourse.
259
The case drew national attention, but never went to trial.
Prosecutors dropped the charges, in part because the young woman

251

Id. at 505.
See, e.g., Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11 (2003) (upholding a sentence of twenty-five years to life in prison for a third felony, a theft offense).
253
Brenda Goodman, Man Convicted as Teenager in Sex Case Is Ordered Freed by Georgia Court, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 27, 2007, at A9.
254
Since the U.S. Supreme Court’s holding in Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558
(2003) found a constitutional right to privacy sufficiently broad to encompass consensual homosexual conduct, virtually all sexual acts between consenting adults are
protected. Notable exceptions are acts of incest and plural marriages. By contrast,
State v. Rodriguez, 174 P.3d 1100 (Or. Ct. App. 2007), rev’d in part, 217 P.3d 659 (Or.
2009) and Wilson v. State, 631 S.E.2d 391 (Ga. Ct. App. 2006) demonstrate severe penalties when one of the participants is a minor, even when the minor gives “factual”
consent.
255
Wayne Coffey, Father Time: Kobe’ [sic] Dad an Ageless Wonder in ABA, NEW YORK
DAILY NEWS, Jan. 16, 2005, at 106.
256
People v. Bryant, 94 P.3d 624, 627 (Colo. 2004).
257
Associated Press, Suit Settlement Ends Bryant Saga, MSNBC NEWS, Mar. 3, 2005,
http://nbcsports.msnbc.com/id/7019659.
258
Kirk Johnson et al., As Accuser Balks, Prosecutors Drop Bryant Rape Case, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 2, 2004, at A1.
259
Id.
252
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also brought civil charges. Her civil suit settled, without the terms
261
of settlement being made public.
Accounts of the case suggest that it fits within a common fact
pattern: the publicized version of the events suggests a situation in
which the man mistakenly believed that the woman had consented to
intercourse, partially due to her consent to some acts short of inter262
course.
As Bryant later admitted publicly, he believed that the intercourse was consensual but indicated that he “recognize[s] now
263
that she did not and does not view this incident the same way I did.”
Had the case been tried, it would have presented one of the
most important questions in current American rape law. As rape law
expanded during the 1970s and 1980s through the influence of feminist groups, prosecutors began at least occasionally prosecuting
264
cases of acquaintance rape. In such cases, guilt may turn on directly conflicting testimony as to the participants’ behavior; that is, the
man may describe a completely different set of facts than the woman
265
presents. But in some cases, even accepting the woman’s version of
the facts, guilt or innocence may turn on whether a mistake of fact
266
exists as to the presence of consent.
And here, American jurisdic267
tions vary in their approaches to the legal question.
In theory, the law ought to follow the general rule governing
268
mistakes of fact, now reflected in Model Penal Code section 2.04(a),
that a mistake of fact is relevant insofar as it negates the relevant
mens rea of the offense. The House of Lords took that approach in
269
270
Regina v. Morgan. But American courts refused to follow Morgan.
Instead, American courts have followed one of two approaches to the
260

Id.
Associated Press, supra note 257.
262
Compare Interview by Dan Loya & Doug Winters with Kobe Bryant in Eagle
County, Cal. (July 2003), available at http://www. thesmokinggun.com/archive/
0924041kobea1.html (last visited Feb. 12, 2009) (discussing Bryant’s perspective on
the events) with Associated Press, Rape Case Against Bryant Dismissed, MSNBC NEWS,
Sept. 2, 2004, http://nbcsports.msnbc.com/id/5861379 (discussing victim’s perspective
on the events).
263
Tom Kenworthy & Patrick O’Driscoll, Judge Dismisses Bryant Rape Case, USA
TODAY, Sept. 2, 2004 at 1A.
264
See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Sherry, 437 N.E.2d 224 (Mass. 1982).
265
See, e.g., id. at 227.
266
Id.
267
See DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 51, at § 33.05 (describing different approaches of courts to mistake of fact situations).
268
MODEL PENAL CODE & COMMENTARIES § 2.04(1)(a) (1985).
269
See generally [1976] A.C. 182 (H.L.) (appeal taken from Eng.) (U.K.).
270
See, e.g., Sherry, 437 N.E.2d at 233.
261
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question: Some have held that the defendant must prove that his mis271
take is reasonable, while others have held that if the woman initially
272
says no, the defendant proceeds at his own risk.
The question is a difficult one. To borrow a phrase from Catherine MacKinnon, if the man has a reasonable mistake defense, “a
273
woman is raped but not by a rapist[.]” A woman’s sense of autonomy may be equally violated whether the man knew that he was proceeding without her consent or not. And yet, rape is graded a serious
felony, often a crime of violence, with commensurate criminal penalties and other disabilities—including, as discussed above, registration
274
for life.
Elsewhere, the debate over some subjective awareness of
serious crimes is largely settled, absent some compelling policies to
the contrary, and even where the criminal law abandons subjective
mens rea, it requires more than mere negligence, the civil tort stan275
dard.
VI. HOW WOULD AN ITALIAN COURT TREAT WILSON AND BRYANT?
Under Italian law, Wilson would certainly be acquitted. The age
of consent in Italy is fourteen and there are no exceptions related to
276
the nature of the sexual acts committed.
A case like Kobe Bryant’s may be more debatable in its judicial
outcome, even though Italian law, at least in theory, is quite clear in
this respect. Under Italian criminal code, rape is no exception to the
277
general rules regarding mens rea. This means that any mistake of
fact on the part of the actor negates the relevant mens rea (dolo), including, in principle, even an unreasonable mistake. Of course
things might be more questionable when it comes to trials and judicial decisions. If the defendant argues that he believed that the
woman was consenting, the judge—there is no jury in Italian trials

271

See, e.g., People v. Stitely, 108 P.3d 182, 208 (Cal. 2005).
See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Simcock, 575 N.E.2d 1137, 1140 (Mass. App. Ct.
1991).
273
Catherine A. MacKinnon, Feminism, Marxism, Method and the State: Toward Feminist Jurisprudence, 8 SIGNS 635, 654 (1983).
274
See Vitiello, supra note 87, at 672.
275
See MODEL PENAL CODE & COMMENTARIES § 2.02 (1985); DRESSLER,
UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 51, at 140– 42.
276
See C.P. art. 609-quater.
277
See C.P. art. 43. For an example of case law on rape defining mens rea, see
Cass. pen., sez. III, 30 mar. 2000, Rivista penale 2000, 687.
272
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278

concerning rape —simply might not believe his allegations. But if
the judicial findings confirm the mistake alleged by the defendant,
his defense will be successful. Given the publicly available information regarding Bryant’s case, he would likely be acquitted in an Italian court because of mistake of fact.
279

VII. DO THE ITALIANS (OR THE AMERICANS) HAVE IT RIGHT?

Turning to more general points, both Italian and American laws
on sexual offenses show some relevant defects. Italian law, from 1996
280
on, contains one single offense of rape. This means that all kinds
of acts of a sexual nature give rise to the same single offense of rape.
A simple kiss on the cheek and the most heinous form of violent sexual penetration will lead to a conviction for the same sexual of281
fense. The different amount of force is not even relevant, because
rape can be committed by a sudden and fleeting slap on the buttock
282
or by threatening the victim with a knife.
The lack of variety of sexual offenses under Italian law creates
confusion and unfair judicial outcomes. Italian courts do not want to
leave Italian sex offenders unpunished and their victims unprotected,
and they tend to convict in cases that fall short of what most consider
rape. This explains why cases such as G.G. and A.M. find such surprising decisions in court. Italian law should develop a more structured system of sexual offenses, categorizing them from the most lenient to the most serious ones. With such a framework in place,
Italian courts would certainly come to more understandable decisions.
With regard to American law, I agree with Professor Vitiello. On
the one hand, some of the offenses seem to be too harshly drafted,
283
such as seen in Professor Vitiello’s discussion of Georgia law above;
278

See CODICE DI PROCEDURA PENALE [C.P.P.] arts. 5–6 (Italy); Law No. 287 of 10
apr. 1951, art. 3, Gazz. Uff. No. 102, 7 may 1951 (Italy); Royal Decree No. 12 of 30
jan. 1941, arts. 42-bis to 43, Gazz. Uff. No. 28, 4 feb. 1941.
279
That is, according to Professor Cadoppi, do the Italians or Americans have it
right?
280
The other sex offenses can be considered “satellites” of the only sex offense
described by C.p. art. 609-bis.
281
For some examples of cases where the Supreme Court discussed whether kisses
could lead to a conviction for rape, see Cass. pen., sez. III, 13 feb. 2007, n. 25112,
Rev. Pen. 2007, 989, 990; Cass. pen., sez. III, 5 oct. 2006, n. 37561, Guida al Diritto
2007, 71, 71; Cass. pen., sez. III, 4 dec. 1998, n. 212821, Giust. Pen. 1999, II, 584, 585;
Cass. pen., sez. III, 27 apr. 1998, DiFrancia, Guist. Pen. 1999, II, 135, 139.
282
See Cadoppi, supra note at 17, at 499–504 (analyzing the case law and commenting on the Italian provisions on rape).
283
See supra notes 241–251.
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on the other hand, general principles such as mens rea should not be
altered in the context of rape, because such exceptions can lead to
discrimination among various types of offenders. Of course, there is
room for minor offenses where the actus reus or the mens rea is less
serious; such offenses could provide for criminal negligence as the
minimum subjective element.
But the consequences of sexual offenses in American law—as
Professor Vitiello has demonstrated elsewhere and here as well—are
very harsh, and they apply normally both to serious and less serious
sexual offenses.
I personally agree that victims of sexual crimes must be protected by the criminal justice system; thus, I agree with some provisions, such as the registration of sexual offenders. But such measures
should only apply to the most serious cases and to the most vicious
offenders, especially to offenders with a high risk of recidivism.
With these specifications, Italian law should provide for some
more effective measures in order to reduce the rate of recidivism in
these matters. The Italian legislature is now discussing introducing
some form of “chemical castration,” which should be applied only in
284
particular cases and with the consent of the offender.
The criminal law should be tailored to reflect criminal behaviors, and criminal sanctions and measures should be fair and proportional to the crime and to the need of society. When laws depart
from such a rule, they create injustice and lead citizens to lose confidence in the criminal justice system as a whole.
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See Modifiche al codice penale e altre disposizioni per la lotta contro la
pedofilia, S. 458, XVI Leg., arts. 6–7 (2008) (Italy).

